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Traditional product differentiation occurs when consumers are offered something that is 
relevant and of perceived value. In contrast, some empirical evidence suggests success is 
achievable by offering a feature that has ambiguous value or revealed to be of meaningless 
value. Previous assessments of such strategies only consider the overall rating of a single 
differentiated product. However, we argue that feature differentiation strategies should be 
assessed in environments where the relative value of the feature is considered and compared 
to trade-offs made on competing features (e.g., price). A theoretical model and experimental 
approach based on random utility theory and signalling theory is offered. We find 
meaningless differentiation is meaningless; however, ambiguous differentiation may be 
successful if contextual signals (e.g., premium pricing; uniqueness) are diagnostic and 
consistent in suggesting its value.  





Many products have differentiating features with benefits that are unclear to consumers. For 
example, manufacturers and/or retailers of scanners may know that optical and not 
interpolated resolution is of relevance in providing benefits to consumers, but consumers may 
not (Broniarczyk and Gershoff 2003). Similarly, the value of additional ingredients in 
shampoo (e.g., Pro-Vitamins) may be uncertain. Such features are defined as “ambiguous”, 
with consumers potentially holding several competing beliefs regarding their value (Garnham 
and Oakhill 1996). Despite uncertainty surrounding the benefits of ambiguous features, 
several researchers observe that consumers may incorporate these features into their decision-
making (e.g., Bronziarczyk and Gershoff 1997; Brown and Carpenter 2000; Carpenter, Glazer 
and Nakamoto 1994; Meyvis and Janiszewski 2002; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). 
 
In some situations consumers may be informed from external sources (e.g., salespersons; 
online FAQs) that the discrepancies in performance on an ambiguous feature are negligible. 
For example, Pantene Pro-V shampoo differentiates itself with pro-vitamin ingredients but 
credible sources (e.g., USA Consumer Reports) suggest that these offer no beneficial effects 
(Bronziarczyk and Gershoff 2003). Most intriguing is that, despite being told of the 
meaningless differentiation, consumers have been observed to maintain a favourable 
evaluation of these products (Bronziarczyk and Gershoff 1997; Bronziarczyk and Gershoff 
2003; Brown and Carpenter 2000; Carpenter, et al 1994; Meyvis and Janiszewski 2002). 
 
While prior literature suggests that ambiguous and meaningless differentiation appears to 
influence overall product choice, the manner in which choices are affected is not well 
understood from theoretical and experimental perspectives. It is also unclear how much 
consumers are willing to pay for such features relative to competing, less ambiguous features. 
To address this, we introduce a theoretical framework embedded in signalling theory (Spence 
1974) and random utility theory (RUT) (Thurston 1927). This departs from previous 
 conceptualisations by suggesting information relating to the ambiguous feature affects the 
relative marginal value of the feature; and, hence, subsequently affects overall choice. We 
propose and experimentally test that the marginal value systematically relates to the content 
and consistency of contextual signals that may support inferences about the feature’s benefits. 
We now review previous approaches, highlighting the value of this proposed departure.  
 
 
Literature Review of Meaningless and Ambiguous Differentiation 
 
Traditionally, it is viewed that successful differentiation can only take place if one offers 
something that is perceived as relevant and of value (Cahill 1996; Lawfer 2003; Porter 1985; 
Rogers 1995). In turn, the empirical evidence supporting the view that success can be 
achieved by offering consumers for which its value is difficult to assess (ambiguous 
differentiation) or is of no value (meaningless differentiation) is intriguing. Various 
explanations have been offered as to why consumers perceive added-value in products that 
have supplemented their basic product with additional but poorly understood features. 
Carpenter et al (1994) conjectures that pragmatic value is contained in the salience of the 
product offering the unique feature and further able to be supported with premium pricing. 
Consistent with a reason-based choice framework (Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993), 
Brown and Carpenter (2000) argue that even though the uniqueness is ambiguous or 
meaningless, it provides consumers with further reasons to support their original choice.  
 
To empirically examine the value of meaningless differentiation, Carpenter et al (1994) 
compared the between-subjects evaluation of a single target “down jacket” in four conditions. 
A 2x2 design manipulated (a) the irrelevance (revealed; subjective) of the target feature (“type 
of down fill”); and (b) the presence/absence of a unique level (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Products Presented in Carpenter et al. (1994) 
Feature I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Temp. Rating 500 500 500 500 550 550 550 550 
Shell Cover Cotton Cotton Synthetic Synthetic Cotton Cotton Synthetic Synthetic 
Stitching Regular Extra Tight Regular Extra Tight Regular Extra Tight Regular Extra Tight 
Down Fill Regular Regular Regular†   Regular Regular Regular Regular Regular 
† - Product III presented as “Regular” in the Undifferentiated Condition ; Presented as “Alpine” in the Differentiated Condition 
 
Subjects in the subjective irrelevance condition were informed that “Alpine” is a goose down 
and “Regular” a mixture of goose and duck. In the revealed condition, subjects were told, in 
addition, that “while the age of the bird matters, the type of bird it comes from does not make 
a difference” (Carpenter et al. 1994, p. 34). When the irrelevance was unknown (i.e., 
subjective irrelevance condition) the mean rating of the target product (Product III) improved 
from 3.1 to 9 for the undifferentiated and differentiated product, respectively. When 
irrelevance was revealed, the product’s mean rating was 4.3 and 8.4 for the undifferentiated 
and differentiated conditions respectively. The authors conclude that the improvement in 
between-subjects ratings supports their hypotheses that a product differentiated by an 
irrelevant attribute will be more highly valued relative to when it is not differentiated. This 
was supported when this irrelevance was unknown/subjective (H1) and known/revealed (H2).   
 
The basic experiment has since been replicated with similar findings across a range of product 
categories (e.g., Brown and Carpenter 2000; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001; Broniarcyk and 
Gershoff 1997, 2003). Other variations include supporting the differentiation with premium 
pricing (Carpenter et al 1994) and manipulating the label of the competing feature (e.g., 
“Regular” to “Nordic”) from which it is differentiated (Broniarcyk and Gershoff 1997; 2003).  
 The Relative Value of Meaningless/Ambiguous Differentiation 
 
The experimental approach followed by Carpenter et al (1994) and others has several 
limitations. First, it is unclear whether differentiation will be successful for any product, 
rather than a single randomly selected target product (e.g., product IV rather than III). A 
product superior on other attributes (e.g., 550 rating; tight stitching) may be more successful 
in differentiating its product because consumers may infer that the unknown value of the 
unique feature may also be superior, similar to inference making strategies observed in the 
missing information literature (Johnson and Levin 1985; Levin, Johnson and Faraone 1984). 
Second, ratings tasks were used and respondents were not given the option to choose neither 
of the products. As a result, the likely outcome of choice deferral (Dhar 1997), induced by the 
uncertainty of the ambiguous feature, is unknown.  
 
A further drawback of previous methods is that the relative value of the differentiation is 
unclear. That is, it is uncertain whether to differentiate products based on the unique but 
ambiguous product feature (e.g., type of down fill) or emphasise performance on less 
ambiguous features (e.g., type of stitching). In order to do this, however, one must understand 
the evaluation process in an environment in which trade-offs between competing features are 
made and using methods by which these trade-offs can be quantified (e.g., RUT combined 
with choice models; see McFadden 1974). While overall belief and evaluation about the 
differentiated product is important, it is conjectured that an a priori process involving the 
individual attribute and its consideration with other unambiguous attributes are key 
components in the conceptual framework of ambiguous differentiation, yet to be accounted 
for. We argue that consumers must determine the relative value of trading off the ambiguous 
product feature (e.g., the value of Alpine over Regular down fill) in an environment where 
competing trade-offs are made on less ambiguous features (e.g., the value of $100 over $200).  
 
Rather than being random in constructing inferences about the importance of ambiguous 
features, however, consumers may be systematic in making sense of their decision 
environment (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986). In other contexts, such systematic behaviour is 
common including consumers use of price information and brand names to infer product 
quality (Brucks, Zeithaml and Naylor 2000; Janiszewski and Van Osselaer 2000; Ordonez 
1998). In order to form beliefs, consumers may perceive and use legitimate pre-purchase 
signals of manufacturers and/or retailers that they may employ to convey information about 
the value of a product feature for which imperfect and asymmetric information exists. This is 
consistent with signalling theory in information economics, which was originally used to 
describe how existing or potential employees can signal their abilities to employers through 
education expenditures (Spence 1974). Signalling theory has been adapted to marketing 
phenomenon to describe how various marketing mix elements reinforce various dimensions 
of product value, including brand equity (Erdem and Swait 1998), pricing and physical 
appearance (Dawar and Parker 1994) and warranties (Boulding and Kirmani 1993).  
 
In turn, we propose that marginal utility, representing the value of an ambiguous feature, 
systematically relates to the content and consistency of various information sources/signals in 
the marketplace. This framework enables the overall value of the differentiated product to be 
measured but decomposed into components relating to all its features. It relates the relative 
value of the ambiguous feature to the various information signals that consumers may use to 
infer its value. It also permits assessment of interactions between product features (indicated 
by two-way interactions) and choice deferral (indicated by the intercept term).  
 
 Experimental Approach 
 
To assess the relative value of ambiguous features as a function of information signals and 
external information, a hypothetical choice task involving DVD recorders was undertaken by 
248 subjects recruited from an online survey panel. DVD recorders were described by five 
features, each with two levels of performance (see Table 2). Each subject evaluated 16 choice 
sets, constructed using a fractional factorial design of resolution V, enabling estimation of 
main effects and two-way interactions. 
 
An equal number of subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight information conditions. 
The 23  information conditions were formed by the full factorial of (i) external information 
(ambiguous; meaningless) and contextual information signals relating to the target feature 
(“Navigation System”) in the form of the (ii) feature’s occurrence in the market (unique; 
equal) and (iii) associated price (average; premium)1. To manipulate external information, an 
attribute glossary described all product features. Subjects in the ambiguous information 
condition were informed that “navigation systems” determine the speed by which one can 
search and view disc chapters. Subjects assigned to the meaningless information condition 
were informed that while a navigation system might use different technologies to search disc 
content they would be unlikely to notice the resulting difference in speed between systems. 
Subjects evaluated eight hypothetical DVD recorders in each choice set. In the “unique” 
(“common”) information signal condition, one (four) product(s) had the NavQwikTM system, 
while seven (four) other products had an identical level of performance (i.e., “Regular”). To 
manipulate the price signal, products with the target attribute level (NavQwikTM) had a higher 
(equal) price on average for the premium (average) information signal conditions.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Multinomial choice models were fitted for each of the eight information conditions. 
Consistent with expectations, in each condition the preferences for the non-target product 
features were significant (Table 2). There were no significant two-way interactions. 
 
Table 2: Average Estimated Willingness to Pay (WTP) for DVD Recorder Features 
Product Feature/Attribute Change in Product Performance WTP ($) 
Ease of Use 2 stars to 4 stars $208.40 
Hard Drive Capacity 12 hours to 25 hours $174.79 
Simultaneous Record and Play Not Available (N/A) to Available  $445.38 
Navigation Search System Regular to NavQwikTM $15.13 
Price $899 to $1099 - 
 
Across all four information signal conditions in which subjects were informed that there is no 
beneficial difference in the “NavQwikTM” and “Regular” navigation systems (i.e., 
meaningless differentiation), the parameter representing importance of the feature in 
determining choice probability was positive but insignificant (α=.05). This suggests that 
while consumers may place some value on a meaningless product feature, the value is 
negligible when considering it in an environment of choice and where trade-offs are made on 
competing but less ambiguous features.  
 
                                                 
1 Similar to Bronziarcyk and Gershoff (1997; 2003) the alternative feature level (Regular) was also manipulated 
(RapidTM).  For brevity, the results of these conditions are not discussed but consistent with those reported. 

















In contrast, the results suggest that ambiguous differentiation may have some benefits 
provided contextual information signals are consistent and diagnostic about the value of the 
feature. Specifically, consumers are willing to pay significantly more for a product with a 
differentiating feature (NavQwikTM rather than Regular Navigation Systems) provided that 
products with this feature are (a) unique; and/or (b) priced at a premium amount. The 
perceived value of the NavQwikTM system is not significant if there are several products in the 
market that offer it but do so without a premium pricing strategy. The t-statistics from these 
models are shown in Figure 1a.  
 
Figure 1a and 1b: Value of Navigation System and Propensity to Defer Product Choice 

















The model also enables investigation of other conditions for and outcomes of ambiguous and 
meaningless differentiation. Specifically, there were no significant two-way interactions in 
any condition, suggesting the evaluations of products offering ambiguous features are not 
conditional upon their performance on other features. The level of choice deferral was 
significantly higher in conditions where the feature was unique relative to conditions in which 
it occurred more often (see Figure 1b). This may be a reflection of the potential relationship 
between uncertainty and choice deferral (Dhar 1997). Specifically, the unique offering may 
provide an environment by which consumers evaluate options with greater levels of 
uncertainty, relative to cases in which more manufacturers offer the ambiguous product 
feature. That is, respondents to infer and strengthen their belief in its value may use the 





In summary, we proposed that the role of ambiguous and meaningless differentiation must be 
assessed by examining (a) the value of such features relative to the trade-offs made on other 
competing product features; and (b) product choices rather than ratings, including the option 
to defer product choice. In doing so, we find some empirical support for strategies in which an 
ambiguous feature is used to differentiate products. This must be supported with specific 
information signals including the uniqueness and/or the premium pricing of the offering. In 
contrast, however, consumers aware of the irrelevance of the differentiation do not place any 
value on the feature in their decision-making. In this regard, we conclude that meaningless 
differentiation is a meaningless product differentiation strategy.  
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